

The Politics of Security Deployment of Security Operatives to Jos Metropolis, Plateau State, Nigeria 2001-2014

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Abstract

The paper examines the politics of security deployment by the Federal Government of Nigeria to Jos, metropolis. A cross-sectional study was conducted and Public Opinion Theory adopted. Methodologically, mixed methods of data collection were conducted that involved the administration of 377 questionnaires to adult respondents, six In-Depth Interviews with religious and community leaders while three Key Informant Interviews with security personnel working with Special Task Force. The survey reveals that, the deployment of Mobile Police from 2001-2010 and the formation of Special Task Force in 2010 has generated mixed reactions and divergent perceptions among the residents of Jos metropolis. Majority of the ethnic groups that are predominantly Christians were more contented with the deployment of the Mobile Police whereas ethnic groups that are dominantly Muslims questioned the neutrality, capability, performance and strength of the Nigerian Police Force in managing the crises. The study recommends that, security personnel should display high degree of neutrality in order to earn the confidence of the residents and change their perceptions.

Key words: politics, crisis, internal security, security deployment, public opinion

INTRODUCTION

Most developing countries particularly in Africa are characterized by the politicization of social institutions including security. It is the politicization and mobilization of social institutions along religious, regional and ethnic divide that constitute the basis for conflicts which proved recalcitrant in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. Thus, ethno-religious crises and political unrests have culminated into what is referred to as lack of security for life and property and has

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assumed a crisis dimension in Nigeria since the return of democratic government in 1999. Indeed, it has almost become an intractable problem since the general elections of 1983. Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 2), asserted that government after government has used various approaches to manage the security crisis, yet abortive. The methodology has remained the same: vote more money to purchase vehicles and equipment, recruit more policemen and give orders for arbitrary arrest, urge all arms of security and intelligence to collaborate in ways that permit those dealing with intelligence and counter-intelligence to dabble in security matters and vice versa, as the case between the Nigerian Police and the State Security Services (SSS). The failure is referred to as orthodox or statist approach to security issues and has called into question its continued employment. As such, scholars and NGOs interested in security issues have begun to seek alternative, democratic, people-friendly and more inclusive means of tackling Nigeria's security crisis thus becomes politically inclined.

In Plateau State, Krause (2011, p. 3) summarized the situation arguing that over the last decade, the political crisis over 'indigene' rights and political representation in Jos, capital of Plateau State, has developed into a protracted communal conflict affecting most parts of the state. At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people have been killed since late 2001, when the first major riot broke out for more than three decades. Fifteen years later, only the heavy presence of military and police forces ensure a fragile calm in the city. Tensions between ethnic groups rooted in allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into explosive mix.

Based on the above, the orthodox response of Federal Government of Nigeria to armed violence during or after was the deployment of thousands of troops to quench the unrest of ethno-religious and political violence in Plateau State and Jos metropolis in particular, located in the North Central region of Nigeria what is referred in this paper as security response. Security response entails the use of force by the police. But it had often failed as a method because many of the communities in conflict are able to overwhelm the Nigeria police and military. Indeed, 'their lack of capacity to guarantee security has itself encouraged arms proliferation' (Ibeanu and Momoh, 2008).

From 2001, security personnel notably military and Mobile Police Force known as (MOPOL) are staged at major routes in the Jos metropolis. Subsequent explosion of violence in 2008, 2010 and 2012 respectively led to the establishment of Special Task Force (STF) comprised of Nigerian Army and Mobile Police Force. The deployment and management of the internal security of Jos metropolis has generated heated debates between the parties involved in

Jos crises, especially Muslim and Christian who were at the epicenter of the crises that pitted against each other by the manipulation of ethnic and political faultiness between the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups that are predominantly Muslims and Afizere, Anaguta and Berom ethnic groups that are mostly Christian faithful.

Therefore, this paper attempts to discuss the causal factors of the crises that bedeviled Jos metropolis for decades and the context of security deployment to the crises, their performances, behaviors and the responses generated among the affected residents in 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2011 respectively which witnessed extensive violence and polarized communities of Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups (overwhelmingly Muslim) against Berom, Afizere and Anaguta (predominantly Christians) (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), 2014, p. 2).

It has been observed that, residents of Jos are living in a state of fear and uncertainty thus the deployment of community security outfit (vigilante) in almost every area of the metropolis and accompanied with the installation of iron bars at the entrance of residential areas and barricades that lead to worshipping centers. For the past 15 years, the residents of Jos metropolis are living in a 'gated society' in which everywhere is cordoned off by the security personnel. Aliyu, et al. (2015, p. 16) summed the situation in Jos caused the security challenges, people do not just take accommodation in any part of the town of their fancies but have to do extensive research to find out whether the area is safe or not. Residential properties in the predominantly Christian area, Jos south are considered as having no any value to a Muslim no matter how magnificent and splendid. This is also applicable to areas that are occupied by Muslims. For a Christian, only an area that is inhabited by Christians is considered safe. No Muslim in his right senses would take up an apartment in such an area. It is even more dangerous for a Muslim to take up an apartment among Christians. No Christian in his right senses would consider such an area a safe zone. In Jos, the capital of Plateau state, caution is the name of the game that adherents of both religions play with one another. Up till now, people in Jos are careful about places they visit. It is unwise for a Christian to visit a predominantly Muslim enclave late in the night. People consider it as high risk. The Muslims are far more accommodating and their places are safer for Christians. It has been discovered that the situation in Jos is still so bad that people are careful in choosing what taxis or Okada they take. Christians do not feel safe riding on motorcycles driven by Hausa Muslims and vice versa (Aliyu, et al., 2015, p. 15).

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The security operatives in Nigeria deployed to war front face a lot of intractable challenges of managing internal security in multiethnic and religious society like Nigeria. The spiraling incidences and intensity of armed violence and insecurity across Nigeria, the increasing activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northern Nigeria and youth restiveness in the oil producing Niger-Delta region posed serious internal security trials for the security operatives to handle because they are at the forefront on the battlefield. These multifaceted problems threaten the capability, neutrality as well as the preparedness of the Nigerian securities strategies and stamina adopted in managing the crises. The residents of Jos metropolis become accustomed to road blockades, checkpoints, harassment and brutality of the security operatives for the past decade in the city where they hitherto moved freely but forced to face the reality of insecurity.

Central to the above security threat in Nigeria is transformation of identities along primordial lines and the entrenchment of negative identity politics, which made ethnic and religions the basis of inclusion or exclusion in the distribution of state resources in the country (Onwe, 2014, p. 2). Dominant ethnic groups systematically exclude minority from national and state processes, acquisition of resources and opportunities for individual and collective development. Indigenes tend to benefit more opportunities and resources than “settlers” i.e. people whose ancestral roots could not be traced to their immediate community of residence notwithstanding how long they might have resided in such community (Onwe, 2014, p. 5). The “indigene” and “settler” identity become the benchmark for inclusion or exclusion in the allocation and distribution of state resources (Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution IPCR; 2003; Sanda; 2003; and Mustapha, 2013). The persistent settler-indigene conflict in Plateau state reflects the longstanding grievances between the Berom, Afizere, Anaguta and other ethnic groups in Jos that are Christians and Muslim communities among them generalized as Hausa and Fulani. The Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are almost entirely Muslims and the indigenous ethnic groups are predominantly Christians and their struggles over land ownership, economic resources and political control tend to be expressed not only in ethnic but also in religious terms (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 5).

In all the crises from 2001 till date, there are allegations, accusations and counter-accusations from the public domain that security personnel handling the crises are supporting one side (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 5). The perception of how soldiers watched unconcerned when people were killed, maimed or property looted abound, a situation which has done much damage to

their credibilities and confidence of the residents on them to protect and defend them. There is upsurge call for the withdrawal of the military by key stakeholders in the Plateau State particularly Christians (Obateru, 2010). The Special Task Force (STF) failed to account for the ethnic cleansing in Kuru Karama, Dogo Na Hauwa, Foron in 2010 and 2011 respectively where innocent women and children under their watches were mercilessly hacked down (Obateru, 2010, p. 3). Other reports on perennial crises in Jos alleged that, in certain instances, security personnel are linked to powerful vested interests therefore, implicated in the prolongation of hostilities (Human Rights Watch, 2001; 2005; 2009). Therefore, state security agencies constitute veritable threat to the security of the citizens of Nigeria. More often than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises thus ramping up social and political tensions. It is against this background that the paper seeks to investigate the politics of security deployment in Jos metropolis.

AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The paper aimed at unearthing the perception of the people of Jos metropolis on the security management of the crises since 2001. Therefore, the main aim of the paper is to understand how the public perceive the internal security management of ethno-religious crises and its relationship with insecurity in the city. The paper also has the following specific objectives:

- i. To identify the factors responsible for the ethno-religious and political crises in Jos.
- ii. To examine the politics of security deployment to Jos metropolis.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- i. What are the factors responsible for recurring ethno-religious and political crises in Jos?
- ii. What informs the politics of security deployment to Plateau State?

SECURITY DEPLOYMENT TO VIOLENT AREA

Internal security has been the crux of national security and has three main objectives of safeguarding territorial integrity, preserving sovereignty and maintaining domestic peace. After the 2008 crisis, a Special Task Force (STF) comprising the military (Nigerian Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the Police forces was established. It regularly patrolled well-known flashpoints within the city to quell

possible unrest. The STF engaged in weapons searches at checkpoints on the routes leading to Jos and major streets in the city. Para-Mallam and Hoomlong (2012, p. 10) stated that the escalation of the conflict within and around Jos prompted the Federal Government to resort to military intervention. Internal security operations carried out to suppress insurrection are supported by Section 217 subsection 2(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The provision allows for the military to act in aid of the civil authority in the maintenance of public order and internal security where the situation demands, subject to such conditions as prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. The initial deployment of soldiers to bring the violence under control alongside the declaration of 24-hour curfew initially stemmed the tide of violence. However, the initial containment soon gave way to allegations of ethno-religious bias in military conduct and silent killings motivated by ethno-religious sentiments persisted at various flashpoints around Jos and environs.

Historicizing the character of Nigerian security deployed to violent scenes, Ibeanu and Momoh (2008, p. 15) maintained that, what constitutes security for the Nigerian state and political elite is traditionally rooted in the state's monopoly and control of all legitimate instruments of coercion and its ability to contain both internal insurgency and external aggression. Security is seen as the exclusive preserve of the state. Indeed, it is treated as a state secret. State security is not often discussed in a democratic manner or perceived as part of the democratization agenda. The state has a conservative view of what constitutes security. While external aggression is left to the military, dealing with internal insurgency is left to the police. When the latter fails to keep the peace, the military is often invited. Quite often, both have used force against students on campuses of tertiary institutions, in the killing of Kunle Adepoju at the University of Ibadan in 1971 and at Ahmadu Bello University in 1986; against the peasants, as in the Agbekoya uprising over taxation in 1968 and the Bakolori massacre over the government's seizure of land in 1982; against journalists, as in the case of Mr. Amakiri in 1973; against the workers, during the general strikes of 1945; and more generally encompassing were the political and electoral violence during general elections etc.

However, in a similar scenario but of different context in Africa, the first peace keeping mission in Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), was deployed shortly after the Ndjamena ceasefire agreement was signed on 8 April 2004 and explicitly mandated to monitor and observe compliance with that agreement as well as facilitate humanitarian relief (Williams, 2010). The mission, the largest ever deployed by the AU, grew to 7,000 peacekeepers by September 2005. While the deployment was recognized for making some

contribution to security in Darfur, it was widely criticized as insufficient. An AU assessment of the force in 2006 pointed to some successes: “AMIS deployment in Muhajeriya halted the SAF (Sudan Armed Forces) advance on this town, which would have resulted in the displacement of around 40,000 IDPs”, and that the continuous presence and patrol operations in Kalma camp “have had a significant impact; indeed, there have been no reported incidents against the IDPs since this intervention started (Peace and Security Council, 2006).

It has been further observed that, protection of civilians is at the centre of the mission’s mandate thus “contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment”. The mission is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Eight years since its deployment, however, conflict in Darfur not only rumbles on but also appears to be on the increase. From the start, UNAMID has faced enormous political and logistical challenges including the inability to fully deploy, attacks on the mission and continuous government obstruction (Farran, 2016, p. 10).

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This section discussed relevant literature on the deployment of security operatives to violent area, particularly in most of the developing countries of Africa and Asia where peacekeeping operations generate a lot of controversies. Security agencies constitute a veritable threat to the security of the citizens of Nigeria. More often than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises, ramping up social and political tensions.

POLITICS OF SECURITY DEPLOYMENT TO VIOLENT AREA

Siddiq (2013, p. 149) gave a vivid analysis of ethnic and religious considerations in deployment of security to violent areas of Pakistan. Over the past 63 years, the Pakistani state has experienced full-blown internal conflicts vis-à-vis three federating units: Baluchistan, East Bengal and Sindh. The central state has used force in all parts of the country, especially wherever it was confronted with disagreement on the federal government’s version of nationalism. Although, it was always insensitive to the multiple identity discourse, the focus on centralized

nationalism became obsessive after the break-up of East Pakistan in 1971.

In addition, Siddiqa (2013, p. 149) found out that the military and dominant elite's mindset resulted in deployment and application of maximum force in handling political crisis in the Eastern wing of the state. The military's partnership with forces of the religious right such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and its militant wings came in handy to unleash terror upon the Bengalis. The army operation "searchlight," launched on March 15th, 1971, cracked down on all dissent in the eastern wing. It was General Muhammad Yahya Khan's military at its best tried to curb difference of opinion. The operation was a response to the six-point demand of the east Bengali leadership to include that (1) the constitution should provide for Federation of Pakistan based on the Lahore Resolution, in its true sense the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. (2) The federal government should deal with only two subjects: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residual subjects should be vested in the federating states. (3) Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan. (4) The power of taxation and revenue collection should be vested in the federating units and the federal centre would have no such power. The federation would be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures. (5) There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries and (6) East Pakistan should have a separate military or paramilitary force, and Navy headquarters should be in East Pakistan). The military which was dominated by Pushtun and Punjabi Generals expressed resentment towards its Bengali countrymen (Siddiqa, 2013, p. 149). The work of Siddiqa (2013, p. 149) has it relevant in this study because it was conducted in a country (Pakistan) that shares some characteristics with Nigeria, a former British colony, multiethnic and religious society. Though, the work is a historical account of the politics of security deployment, it has carried out an empirical research on the politics of security deployment to internal security management in Jos metropolis not in the whole country like what Siddiqa did in the whole of Pakistan.

Gallimore (2010, p. 10) argued that, many military officers occupied the

role of leadership in the government that belongs to Hutu ethnic extraction in Rwanda. In fact, being in the army provides protection for internal Hutu enemies from the North. Though, there was no threat from Tutsis either, because when Habyarimana assumed the presidency, promised to end the cycle of violence and allowed Tutsis who had fled to neighboring countries out of fear to return. He calculated that with his promise, no Tutsi from outside would shake the “peaceful Rwanda”, but unleashed genocidal attacks on their arrivals (Gallimore, 2010). The work of Gallimore has shown the role ethnicity in security of Rwanda but did not carry out an empirical study to verify some of the assertions documented during the Rwandan genocide on the perception of the Rwandese on the security handling of the violence. Gallimore’s work is relevant to this work because Nigeria is a multiethnic society like Rwanda which ethnicity usually manifests in both public and private lives of the Nigerians. Therefore, this study seeks to view the perceptions of the residents of Jos regarding the politics of security deployment and the security strategies adopted in the management of insecurity. Though, Rwanda had a history of insecurity exacerbated by ethnic divisions but religious differences were less pronounced and Gallimore gave only historical account of the politics of security deployment in Rwanda. However, this study went beyond historical account of politics of security deployment to the scene of peace operations and conducted empirical research where the views of the residents of Jos metropolis and the security personnel handling the affairs of the city were sought in order to address the lingering security challenges in the area.

Bhakti, et al, (2009, p. 3) maintained that military involvement in the maintenance of domestic peace was the extension of the concept of ‘national security’ to include internal securities. Militaries not only devise military techniques and doctrine for confronting domestic insurgency but also interested in the social and political reasons for insurgency. In countries where civilian-dominated governments are more unrepresentative, the military comes to power to institutionalize its role, such as in Indonesia, Chile and Brazil. In most of the developing world, militaries are mainly concerned with internal security. This implies that in the future, military officers throughout the world would be more interested in politics and government (Bhakti, et al., 2009, p. 10). This further explains that the military involvement in security operations is to forward and safeguard the interests of their leaders be it political, religious or ethnic when the need arises and occurs in the recruitment, posting and transfer of men and officers of the security agencies in Nigeria. Thus, empirical study was conducted using different methodologies and study settings on the politics of security deployment unlike Indonesia, Brazil and Chile that have relatively low security challenges caused by ethnic and religious differences. Like Nigeria, Brazil and Chile have

been struggling with various forms of crimes due to the activities of drug cartels and gang mafias in South and North America.

Bhakti, et al, (2009, p. 10) documented the history of the military deployment to curb violence in Indonesia, its role in politics and perpetrating violence. The role of the military in politics and politics of its deployment had been defined during the Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto eras (1966-1998). However, following military reform era (beginning mid-1998), the role of the military has been reduced to the introduction of democracy in Indonesia. Despite the various stages of military reforms, the military involvement in politics in different forms still exists. They argued that given the historical dual role (being in politics and security provision) of the military, the military 'has been able to set agendas and perpetrate violence without civilian oversight. For instance, this has led to different acts of violence in Papua, perpetrated by the police and military when they were deployed for peacekeeping missions of civil unrest. The above assertion shows how military and the police were deployed to protect the interest of the government during an unrest by some ethnic groups that were perceived to be anti-government in the region of Papua and unleashed terror on the people they are constitutionally charged to defend and protect. As one of the objective of this research, this work has empirically examined the politics of security deployment to Plateau State since the outbreak of major violence in 2001, the perceptions of the residents of Jos metropolis on the security strategies adopted and the assessment of their performances were also evaluated.

Dhillon (2005, p. 249), surveyed the politics of policing in India between 1947-2002 and concluded that, members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC), an armed reserve police force was dispatched to city of Meerut in 1987 to enforce a curfew that was imposed in response to preliminary rioting exasperated by religious militants that had already killed 53 within a week, 44 miles north of New Delhi in Uttar Pradesh. PAC officers were given authorization to shoot-on-sight any threats that arose during the riots. What transpired was discrimination that resulted in murders. Amnesty International (1988) reported that the PAC had accumulated 117 extra-judicial killings of young Muslim men during the Meerut riots. The relatively high presence of Muslims in the reserve police force did nothing to resolve the mounting tensions in Meerut. Muslims composed about 6.7% of Uttar Pradesh's PAC during the 1987 riots. Muslim paramilitary officers were ordered to surrender their weapons and take a leave of absence. By demobilizing the Muslims members of the taskforce, the window for biases in paramilitary performance had been opened. By the fifth day, paramilitary troops totaled 6,400 and the police about 10,000 in Meerut began door-to-door searches to quell the sporadic rioting, looking for violence inciters and materials that had

been used to create explosives. It was that time that the majority of shootings by the PAC occurred when both Hindu civilians and the troops deployed to the area to defend citizens committed many atrocities (Ayodhya massacre) against the Muslim minority over Babari Mosque dispute.

In addition, Dhillon (2005, p. 249) maintained that, the partisanship displayed by the PAC officers was possibly due to the lack of authoritative positions held by Muslims to ensure impartiality. As stated above, there were few Muslims in the paramilitary forces and those that have been inducted as soldiers lacked equal opportunity for promotion or prestigious assignments (Dhillon, 2005). The balance of power was weighted against the Muslims, where they were often transferred to insignificant posts. Therefore, work of Dhillon is relevant to this work because India and Nigeria have some similarities; former British colonies, developing countries, multiethnic and multi religious societies though the work was a historical account of internal security of India and the politics therein in the deployment to the scene of violence not an empirical survey. Therefore, this study conducted a cross sectional survey and evaluated the deployment of security to the crisis areas as it happened in India.

Similarly, (Tran, n.d, p. 69) conducted a longitudinal research of how religion and race played significant role in the deployment of forces to quell unrest in India. In 1992 in the city of Ayodhya, 150,000 militants were led by leaders from the Hindu nationalist parties Bharatiya Janata Party and Vishwa Hindu Parishad on an alleged organized plan to destroy the Babri Mosque. The existing controversy over the 464-year-old mosque stemmed from the belief that the first Mughal emperor of India, Babur, destroyed an existing temple dedicated to commemorate the birthplace of Rama in 1528 and built his own. With the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in the mid-1980s, the issue became much more prevalent in the following years with a previous attempt to destroy the mosque in October 1990, until the issue came to a head two years later (Tran, n.d, p. 69).

Accepting the assurance by Kalyan Singh, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (the state in which the ancient city of Ayodhya is located), that the Bharatiya Janata Party should not take any unauthorized action against the mosque, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's administration had then relied on political and legal constraints to prevent harm to the mosque. However, this could not ease the tension mounting on the ground. As Hindu militants approached the mosque under the cover of a religious ceremony, New Delhi posted CRPF units in nearby Faizabad and deployed RAF regiments to the mosque. However, paramilitary units took 40 hours to start a security perimeter at the heart of the site, after the three domes of the mosque had already been taken down. This apathy shown on the part of the soldiers, who have sworn oaths to fulfill their duties of protecting

and safeguarding the society, was not an isolated matter. However, it has been revealed in independent studies that the blame could not be solely placed upon the paramilitary unit: Rapid Action Force (RAF) soldiers were caught between upholding their roles in protecting the mosque and fulfilling contradictory orders from the Union government which sought to resolve the issue peacefully and the state government of Uttar Pradesh which was committed to aiding the Hindu militants (Tran, n.d). The work of Tran rightly documented the perceptions of the Indians on the politics of security deployment but failed to conduct an empirical research on the magnitude and effects of the apathy on internal security. Thus, this work has conducted a cross-sectional study unlike longitudinal conducted by Tran, used a relatively small sample, qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection though in a similar heterogeneous society.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The researchers adopted Realist Theory of Security for the paper. It has been deduced from the literature that, security in most of the developing countries is an exclusive sphere of the state. One of the major propositions of the Realist Theory is that, national security revolves around the realist paradigm, which argues that global policies are always the struggle between states to reach power, under a situation of anarchy, where they compete for their own national interests. In this context, states rely on military power to guarantee those interests, counteracting the threats that arise from other states armed forces. In this way, national sovereignty and balance of power, which are distributed among the different states, are related unmistakably to what it is understood by security (Angel, 2004, p. 10).

Realism identifies military power as the primary and main tool in the maintenance of a given state's sovereignty and national security (Saleh, 2010, p. 8). Realism argues that the main responsibility of the state is to protect its citizens against internal and external threats. However, realists seek to serve and satiate the national interest and national security through military might. Military power, therefore, is seen as a political instrument through which strength could be demonstrated, counter threats exercised, domestic security guaranteed, external attack deterred, territorial integrity maintained, peace preserved, and prestige acquired. Military power is also used as an instrument in diplomatic negotiations, and as political propaganda (Sheehan, 2005, p. 44).

However, the realist approach in comprehending the concept of security is inadequate because it serves to impose interpretations of human nature and the objective world which are in fact the distinct property of particular dominant

groups within Western society. The realist theory thus, serves only the interests of the dominant groups at the expense of others' interests, therein 'underpinning a fundamentally unjust political and economic order' which consequently causes discontentment within societal groups (Sheehan, 2005, p. 45). In sum, realists' understanding of the concept of security has been 'related more to states than to people (Saleh, 2010). The realists' views show that it is solely the affairs of government to monopolize the provision of security which is strictly armed forces domain and its control over the citizens. Therefore, this study seeks to have the discourse of the operative mechanisms that government adopted in the management of internal security in the area studied and found out that government heavily relies on the use of force though it had adopted different strategies in managing the security challenges in Jos metropolis such as the establishment commissions of enquiries and Plateau peace summits.

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The paper adopted mixed methods of data collection as the primary source of data while reviewed books, journal articles and other documented texts as the secondary source of data. The research design adopted enables the researchers to collect data from the sample population at the same time. A cross-sectional survey design was considered suitable for the study because it permits the use of a balancing and corroborating of the data obtained from fieldwork on the subject matter. The researchers administered structured questionnaires to the residents, conducted six (6) In-Depth-Interview (IDI) with community and religious leaders and snowballing for the security personnel (police and the military) where three (3) Key Informant-Interview (KII) was conducted.

For quantitative method, questionnaire contained forty questions, with closed-ended questions administered to the adult residents of Jos metropolis regardless of their sex, ethnic affiliation, religious, educational and social backgrounds that are at least 23 years old as at 2016. The questionnaire was used to collect data with a view to enabling the researchers to retrospect what happened from 2001-2014. The questionnaire sought information on the demographic characteristics of the respondents as well as their perceptions on the causes of Jos crises and internal security mechanisms adopted. It also sought information on the politics of military deployment to Plateau State, the role of media in the conflict, evaluation of the performance of security operatives, the level of confidence residents have on them as well as neutrality in their operations.

For the qualitative method, IDI guide for community and religious leaders sought information on thematic issues for the study. like the questionnaire which

contained 59 questions KII guide for security personnel contained 13 questions. The researchers conducted six In-depth Interviews with retired police officers, religious and community leaders in six out of the seven Electoral Ward surveyed in Jos metropolis and three Key Informant Interviews with security personnel working with the Special Task Force (STF) because they possessed key information on the security operations and strategies adopted in Jos metropolis.

Respondents were selected from different social backgrounds and locations in the Jos metropolis including retired security personnel. Serving security personnel were selected from Special Task Force (Operation Safe Heaven) with the use of snowballing technique. They were selected with the belief that they would provide access to useful data to enable the researchers address the research objectives. Respondents were selected from different backgrounds to ensure that researchers did not simply pick those who would support one argument and disregard the other.

Table: The Selection and Distribution by Sample Size

S/N	Name of Ward	No. of selected ward	LGA	Registered Voters	No. of Streets	Sample
1.	Ali Kazaure	Ali Kazaure	Jos North	15,726	2	62
2.	Gyel-Bukuru	Gyel-Bukuru	Jos South	11,258	2	35
3.	Gangare					
3.	Giring	Giring	Jos South	12,418	2	39
4.	Tafawa Balewa	Tafawa Balewa	Jos North	4,245	2	26
	Jos Jarawa					
5.	AnguwanDoki	AnguwanDoki	Jos South	17, 245	2	54
6.	Sarkin Arab	Sarkin Arab	Jos North	10, 303	2	32
	Abba Na Shehu					
7.	Tudun Wada/ Kabong	Tudun Wada/ Kabong	Jos North	41,015	2	129
8.	JentaApata					
9.	Naraguta A					
10.	Naraguta B					
	Total			120, 196	28	377

Source: Field Survey (2016).

The quantitative data collected from fieldwork were sorted, coded and entered on the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) International Business Machine (IBM) Version 23.0 for computer processing. Information from the data was printed in tables which were used for analysis. Qualitative data from in-depth interviews were transcribed in a thematic format according to the objectives of the study.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

This section presented analysis and interpretation of data collected from the fieldwork. The researchers administered 377 questionnaires, 341 valid questionnaires were retrieved which is 90.5% response rate. The study conducted six In-Depth Interview (IDI) with retired police officer, religious and community leaders while three Key Informant Interview (KII) with security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF).

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

This section present the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents surveyed in the fieldwork.

Table 1: Socio-demographic Profile of Respondents

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sex		
Male	137	40.2
Female	204	59.8
Total	341	100
Ethnic affiliation		
Afizere	36	10.7
Anaguta	40	11.8
Berom	90	26.6
Fulani	17	5.0
Hausa	59	17.5
Igbo	42	12.4
Others	54	16.0
Total	338	100

Age group		
23-33	192	57.0
34-45	118	35.0
>45	27	8.0
Total	337	100
Marital status		
Married	132	39.5
Divorced	10	3.0
Widowed	14	04.2
Single	178	53.3
Total	334	100.0
Educational level		
Non-formal	15	04.5
Primary	16	04.7
Secondary	115	33.8
Tertiary	191	56.7
Total	337	100
Religious affiliation		
Christianity	241	71.1
Islam	96	28.3
Tradition	2	0.6
Total	339	
Occupational status		
Trading	128	31.0
Farming	17	05.1
Civil servant	104	28.2
Artisan	31	09.3
Others	55	16.3
Total	335	

Source: Field Survey (2016).

Result in table 1 presents the socio-demographic profile of respondents. With respect to the sex, the data showed that 59.8% were males, because they are the ones who come out when the researcher visited their households while 40.2% were females. Hence the majority of the responses of this research are the perceptions of the male residents of Jos metropolis because they have the

highest response rate. Among the respondents, majority of them are of Berom ethnic background which constitutes 26.6%, followed by Hausa with 17.5%, other ethnic groups 16.0%, Igbo 12.4%, Anaguta 11.8%, Afizere 10.7%, and Fulani 5.0%. This implies that majority of the residents of the area surveyed were Berom and Hausa, who are the ethnic groups that are at loggerheads with each other in the Jos crises.

In addition, the results in the table indicates that respondents aged 23-33 were the highest among the residents of Jos with 57.0%, 35.0% of the respondents fall within the age range of 34-45 years, only 8.0% of study respondents were 45 years and above. This could have implications for outbreak of crises due to the heterogeneity of the population who are in their youthful ages hence possessed the tendency to involve in violence. With regard to marital status, the table shows that more than half of the respondents were single with 53.3%, as against 39.5% of the married, 4.2% widow and 3.0% divorced. From this result, most of the respondents in the study area are single with appreciable number of widows. This could have been possible given the number of crises that engulfed the city, where a lot of lives were lost. Also, in the above table, 56.7% of the respondents had tertiary education; a wide difference from those with secondary education 33.8%, followed by those with Primary education 4.7% while a few of them 4.5% had non-formal education.

Overall, study respondents have acquired some level of education. Sizeable number attempted formal education. The finding is consistent with the urban nature of the study area; most educated people are expected to live in the urban areas leaving less educated in the rural areas. Substantial number of respondents noted that they practice Christian religion 71.1%, 28.3% were Muslims and 0.6% practiced African traditional religion. This have implication on the security situation due to the longstanding grievance often expressed in violence between Christians and Muslim in Jos. In terms of occupation, most respondents had single major occupation (civil service), they also complemented them with other economic activities to sustain their livelihood. Majority of respondents numbering 31.0% engaged in trading, closely followed by 28.2% who are civil servants. Other occupation made up of 16.3%, artisan 9.3% and subsistence farmers constituted 5.1% of the respondents. The finding shows that most of the residents of Jos metropolis surveyed were entrepreneurs and civil servants. Competition, envy and jealous of ethnic groups that dominated economic activities and civil service tend to lead to violence.

Table 2: Wards in Jos North and South

Wards	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Ali Kazaure	47	13.8
Gyel-Bukuru	12	03.5
Giring	37	10.9
Tafawa Balewa	43	12.6
AnguwanDoki	14	04.1
Sarkin Arab	29	08.5
Tudun Wada/Kabong	128	37.5
JentaAdamu	31	09.1
Total	341	100

Source: Field Survey (2016).

Table 2 shows that Tudun Wada ward has the highest respondents of 37.5% followed by Ali Kazaure 13.8%, Tafawa Balewa Ward 12.6%, Giring 10.9%, Jenta Adamu 9.1%, Sarkin Arab 8.5%, Anguwan Doki 4.1%, and Gyel-Bukuru 3.5%. With this, respondents were sampled based on the population of adult in their respective electoral wards. The distribution was based on the number of their registered voters which Tudun Wada/Kabong has the highest number of registered voters in Jos North while Gyel-Bukuru has the smallest number of registered voters among the sampled wards. This implies that, the respondents were evenly sample based on the population of their wards and registered voters. After the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, the next section is on the factors responsible for causing the crises.

Deployment of security personnel to Jos metropolis is beleaguered with criticisms from the residents. There are segments of the residents that are contented with the deployment particularly among the Hausa, Fulani and Muslim residents whereas BeromAfizere, Anaguta and other ethnic groups who are predominantly Christians preferred the deployment of the Police to military. Therefore, tables below present politics involved in the security deployment to handle internal security for the past fourteen years.

Table 3: Religious Affiliation of Security Personnel Deployed

Religious Affiliation	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Predominantly Christians	91	26.7
Predominantly Muslims	190	55.7
Predominantly Christians/Muslims	15	04.4
No response	45	13.2
Total	341	100

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

Table 3 indicates that, 26.7% of the respondents were of the opinion that security personnel deployed to Jos are predominantly Christians, 55.7% of the respondents said the personnel of the security operatives are predominantly Muslims 4.4% are Christian/Muslims while 13.2% no response.

Discrediting the above statement, a respondent submitted that:

We do not consider region and tribe in the posting, no consideration of tribalism and religion in the deployment to any part of Nigeria. I am from South-West, my colleague is from North-East, our head is from South-South. This shows neutrality in the security men. It was not what people talk in the markets and streets that happened in our work (KII with security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF), 24th May, 2016).

This implies that, residents of Jos metropolis are cautious of the religious beliefs of the security personnel deployed to their areas which affect their senses of judgment and assessment of the performance of security personnel and operative strategies adopted.

Table 4: Presence of Security Agents in the Metropolis

Security Agents	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Staged at Strategic areas	45	13.2
Mounted Check Points	193	56.6
Regular Patrol	76	22.2
Staged at Strategic areas/ Mounted check points	4	01.2
Mounted Check Points/ Regular Patrol	7	02.1

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

On the presence of security personnel in the parts of the Jos metropolis, 13.2% opined that security personnel were staged in strategic areas, 56.6% stated that, the security mounted check points in their areas, 22.2% were of the opinions that security personnel have been carrying out regular patrol in their areas. Staged at strategic areas/mounted check points constituted 1.2%, mounted check points/regular patrol 2.1%, staged at strategic areas/ mounted check points/ Regular patrol 2.6% and no response 2.1%. Substantiating the above arguments during an in-depth interview, a respondent stated thus:

Yes, we have check points in our areas we have one before Millionaire Quarters, and the one after the community Shaka, Gold and Base. They have been there for quite a long time (IDI with Community Leader in Giring Ward 2nd June, 2016).

The findings implied that, the security personnel were deployed to different parts of metropolis. A security of the Special Task Force in Jos during KII gave a breakdown of how they were divided in the entire Plateau State for easy security administration.

The Special Task Force (STF) had adopted different strategies. These include the division of the entire Plateau State into nine (9) sectors to achieve optimal performance, easy operations and quick response to any breach of peace in the metropolis. There are five sectors managing the Jos metropolis. They are 12, 3, 4, and 6, while sector 5, 7, 8 and 9 are outside the Jos metropolis. Sector one: covers places like Plateau High School, U-Turn, Apapta, Shagari Corner, Katako, UnguwanKare and St.

Augustine Major Seminary. Sector two: covers Bauchi road and Terminus. Sector three: manages Race Course (Rikkos), Nasarawa Gwom, Lamingo, New JUTH. The areas under sector four include the following: NTA, Angul D, NASCO and Plateau State Polytechnic (KII with security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF), 24th May, 2016).

Table 3: The Geopolitical Zones of the Security Personnel

Region	Frequency	Percentage (%)
North-West	83	24.3
North-Central	55	16.1
North-East	69	20.2
South- South	49	14.4
South-West	21	06.2

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

On the geopolitical zone, which most of the security personnel deployed to Jos metropolis hail from, 24.3% of the respondents stated they hail from North-West, 16.1% North-Central, North-East 20.2%, South-South 14.4%, South-West 6.2%, South-East 5.3%, and those that did not respond 13.5%. The findings indicate the existence of religion, ethnic and geopolitical zone considerations in posting security personnel to Plateau in order to ensure neutrality in their operations but most of the security personnel posted to Jos denied it. A respondent and security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF) disagreed with the above statement. He recounted that:

It was a fallacy, I am from North-Central, precisely Nasarawa State deployed to Jos, I am here to discharge my national duty, we do not give a damn about religion and tribe in the uniform work, there is neutrality, we are not here to protect any interest, tribe or religion (IDI with security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF), 24th May, 2016).

Table 4: Public Perception of Security Personnel Deployed to Jos to Protect Particular Ethnic Group

Protect	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly agree	33	09.9
Agree	79	23.7
Disagree	183	54.8
Strongly disagree	39	11.7
Total	334	100

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

Respondents from table 4 above that constituted 9.9% strongly agreed that the security personnel deployed to manage internal security in Jos were purposely to protect a particular ethnic group, 23.7% of the respondents agreed that the security operatives are posted to Jos solely to protect an ethnic nationality. However, large proportion of the respondents surveyed that constituted 54.8% strongly agreed that the securities are deployed to protect a particular ethnic group in Jos while 11.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed. The result implies that the security personnel were deployed to protect and secure the entire residents of the metropolis not some sections or segments of the inhabitants. A respondent during IDI submitted that:

Of course, this is the key thing I would have problem on the Plateau, I could assure you when they are deployed to the State and allocated to communities that is where they played a negative role by influencing Muslims to be at the side of the Christians so that they could help if problem comes, they intimidated other faiths. I believed that has played a negative effect in the crises on the Plateau because most of the crises were fueled by those personnel that ordinarily we thought they are supposed to protect our lives and properties” (IDI with Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Jos North Branch, 26th May, 2016).

Similarly, another respondent expressed a different opinion. He reported that: The Police took side with the Christians, we have record in Ali Kazaure where 7 families were

attacked and killed in 2008. In Race Course, security personnel beaten and damaged properties of Muslims by the Mobile Police but the military deployment was a blessing. We preferred military but Police supposed to be the one to take charge (IDI with Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) Jos North 22nd May, 2016).

Expressing a different opinion on the security handling of internal security in Jos, a respondent submitted that:

You know that is another area of problem. In fact, there was a particular point in time when people were just shouting. They should remove the security people because they connived with some people, taking side with the Muslims, the thing was political, religious and spiritual, that was why I said spiritual before because of the religiosity involved. Sometimes, the Police backed one religion against the other Muslims against Christians. They posted any military personnel or people whether they are Christians or Muslims, if the place is a Christian area like ours place, if they discovered there are Muslims there, they even involved themselves. The rumour has it that they even involved in killing people and causing more problem by aiding and abetting crimes and injuries and deaths (IDI with Community Leader in Anguwan Doki, 2nd June, 2016).

A respondent in Tudun Wada also expressed a similar view with that of Anguwan Doki during KII and submitted thus:

We in Christian dominated areas Holshe and Tudun Wada areas felt that the posting was not fair because the Muslims are brought to this place instead of protecting the citizens, the military wreaked havoc, that is the political aspect of it and that is how we see it generally (KII with retired Police officer in Tudun Wada, 28th June, 2016).

However, a respondent in Sarkin Arab Ward disclosed a different opinion from that of residents of Anguwan Doki and Tudun Wada Jos. The respondent expressed that:

We do not believe in the Police, we see them as agent of CAN, we could not differentiate between original and fake Police during violence, their targets are Hausa and Muslims. You see what happened during the time of Jonah Jang when he banned Okada (Commercial Motorcycle) in Jos. He used Police and MOPOL to attack our children plenty of our people were killed around Dogon Agogo, Zololo junction and Massallacin Juma'a areas. It was the military that restored hope. If not because of them, we would have left (Jos) this place long time (IDI with Community Leader, 25th May, 2016).

Military personnel of the Special Task Force (Operation Safe Heaven) debunked the accusations and allegations that they were deployed not to protect any particular ethnic group. During an interview session, he submitted that:

So far you are Nigerian security, you could go anywhere. I am from Osun State, I do not understand Hausa language, my Oga is from Akwa Ibom, then which ethnic group are we going to protect in Jos. Citizens should stop baseless thinking. We relate with any community posted, we interact with their leaders, they came here. We have cordial relationship with Mai-Anguwa and vigilante in case there is any security issue (KII with Special Task Force officer, 24th May, 2016).

Apparency from the above interviews and results is that both security personnel and residents of Jos metropolis expressed their perceptions based on their social locations, memories of the past crises and the religions they belong to. Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Igbo and other ethnic groups that are Christians largely believed that the military was deployed to protect the Fulani and Hausa ethnic groups while the Fulani and Hausa believed that the Nigerian Police was deployed to protect the Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Igbo and other ethnic groups that are predominantly Christians. These accusations and counter accusations led the establishment of Special Task Force (Operation Safe Heaven) to takeover security matters from the Nigerian Police Force. Since 2010 military mounts check points on every major route within and outskirts of the state capital.

Table 5: Religion, a Major Consideration in Posting Heads of Security Personnel

Posting	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly agree	144	43.1
Agree	117	35.0
Disagree	57	17.1
Strongly disagree	16	04.8
Total	334	100

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

Result from the above table indicates that 43.1% of the respondents strongly agreed that religion has been a major considering factor in posting the heads of security personnel to Plateau State since the outbreak of major violence in 2001, 35.0% of the respondents agreed religion is among the factors considered in the posting of heads of security personnel to the state, 17.1% of the respondents disagreed and 4.8% of the respondents strongly disagreed that religion of the security personnel determines their postings to Plateau State. This shows that, religion has been a major considering factor in the posting of heads of security going by the religion of the heads of security personnel posted to the State for the past fourteen years which majority of the Commissioners of Police and Commandants of the Special Task Force, Operation Rainbow were Christians whereas General Officer Command (GOC) of the 3rd Armour Division Jos had not been dominated by a particular religion. The findings show that significant majority of the respondents surveyed are aware of the posting of security heads to Plateau state and perceived the postings have been religiously motivated. Key Informant Interview supplemented the above argument where a respondent submitted that:

Well! I could really say, but I think religion is one of the major considerations, because during Yar'Adua government, most of the security personnel including the commandant of the 3rd Armour Division was a Muslim, Major General Saleh Maina who during his reign in Jos, a lot of atrocities took place, he took side in his operation in Jos, to the point that the President and his wife had a long fight with the Governor of the State, then Governor Jang. During Jonathan's regime, most of the security

personnel posted to Jos from 2010 were Christians. So, religion is one of the major considerations in posting security personnel (KII with retired security personnel in Kabong, 28th June, 2016).

Counteracting the above submission of the resident of Jos on the posting of Heads of security personnel, one of the security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF) during KII retorted that:

We heard it, but it was before, all ethnic groups embraced us, as you can see Hausaman, Igboman brought cases and we judged them. We received complaints from everybody and responded swiftly and rapidly even quarreled in the neighbourhood. There was neutrality in the positing. I am from Yobe State, Major General Tagbo Ude is the STF commandant, I do not know his state of origin, that is military for you (KII with military personnel of the Special Task Force 24th May, 2016).

Furthermore, another respondent controverted the position of the above security personnel of the Special Task Force (STF). He reported that:

Of course, I could tell you categorically quite a number of them (military) have been posted to Plateau State but really I would tell you most of them were influenced before but posted especially from the other religion (Islam). Most of them are Muslims. For the Police, I could say it was a balance posting because some of them are Muslims, while others Christians. And when you talk of the military, I remembered when Maina was the GOC in the Plateau state it was a very terrible experience for the Christians especially in the side of the Christian communities (IDI with Community leader in Giring Ward 2nd June, 2016).

Another respondent held a different opinion with other residents of Jos interviewed above during IDI, he submitted that:

The Federal government has been posting Heads of security to Plateau State based on criteria known to them. To tell you the truth, military were more neutral but it has been long a time Muslim has been posted to Plateau State as Commissioner of Police

since 2008 when M.D. Abubakar was transferred. The Head of Operation Safe Heaven was a Christian but they were relatively fair to all sides (IDI with official of JNI 22nd May, 2016).

Table 6: The Influence of Retired Military Officers from Plateau State in Security Deployment

Influence	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly agree	39	11.9
Agree	101	30.8
Disagree	164	49.7
Strongly disagree	25	07.6
Total	328	100

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

Table 6 above shows that 11.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that the retired military officers from Plateau State influenced the deployment of security personnel to the state, substantial proportion of the respondents that constitute 30.8% agreed that retired military officers from the state influenced the deployment of the security personnel during or after the outbreak of violence. However, majority of the respondents amounting to 49.7% disagreed with the assertion and 7.6% of the respondents strongly agreed with the notion. Depending on the background of the respondents, the result shows a disagreement between/among the respondents on the involvement of retired military from the state in influencing the number of security personnel posted in the areas, the time of posting, place to work and the operative mechanism to be used. Some respondents also expressed their opinions during an in-depth interview. A respondent submitted further that:

Actually, I could not say for now, but I know that in 2008, most of the security personnel were those of the Islamic faith because I remember the then Governor, Speaker and other stakeholders in the state raised an alarm on the postings of the security personnel. Really the likes of General Nimyel Dogon Yaro, Lieutenant General Jeremiah Timbut Useini, General Domkat Bali, Major Sati Gogwim, General Yakubu Gowon, Air. Commodore Jonah

Jang who was the then Governor and host of others stood for Plateau during the period of crises could not fold their hands and watch Plateau fall (IDI with retired security officer in Gyel-Bukuru Ward, 2nd June, 2016).

Corroborating the above assertion of the involvement of retired military officers from Plateau State in the security deployment to the state, respondent further argued that:

Retired soldiers in Plateau have been using their connections to put hands in the posting of junior officers and top officers. Since the establishment of the Special Task Force (STF) in 2010, most of their commandants are Christians. We only have balance in the posting of the GOC of 3rd Armoured Division. With all the influence of the retired Generals, nonetheless military were somehow neutral unlike the Police (IDI with Community Leader in Sarkin Arab Ward, 25th May, 2016).

Both quantitative and qualitative results indicated the existence of influence of the retired military officers from Plateau State on the postings of security heads and other personnel to the State during violence and peacekeeping. This illustrates the struggles between the desire to protect religious and ethnic interests of the retired security officers and the need to achieve optimum operation of tackling insecurity in the metropolis. For instance, the security personnel failed to set aside religious and ethnic considerations to meet its objectives during operations in Jos. This has been a major security challenge.

Table 7: Level of satisfaction of residents with the security management

Safety	Frequency	Percentage (%)
General sense of safety		
Very safe	47	14.0
Safe	239	71.1
Not safe	40	11.9
Not safe at all	10	30.0
Total	336	100.0

Time, it takes to reach the nearest security post		
10minutes	169	51.1
20minutes	101	30.5
30minutes	41	12.4
1hour	20	6.0
Total	331	100.0
Confident on security personnel to protect		
Trust very well	24	07.2
Trust	178	53.5
Do not trust	118	35.4
Do not trust at all	13	3.9
Total	333	100.0
Religious dominance in the area		
Christianity	222	67.1
Islam	64	19.3
Mixed	44	13.3
Traditional religion	1	0.3
Total	331	100.0
Type security personnel are in the area		
Military	205	74.8
Police	41	15.0
Both	28	10.2
Total	274	100.0
Adequacy of security personnel in the area		
Adequate	153	46.7
Inadequate	117	43.3
Total	270	100.0
Dominated of single ethnic group		
Yes	299	87.7
No	42	12.3
Total	341	100.0

Source: Questionnaire Administered (2016).

Table 7 portrays that, fourteen percent (14.0%) of the respondents rated their areas very safe, safe 71.1%, not safe 11.9%, majority of the respondents 30.0% rated their areas not safe at all. On the length of time for security agents to arrive at the scene of violence or attack, 51.1% of the respondents said it took security operatives 10 minutes to arrive, 30.5% 20 minutes, 12.4% 30 minutes, and 6.0% 1 hours. On the level of confidence residents of Jos metropolis have on the security personnel, 7.2% trusted them very well, 53.5% trusted them, 35.4% did not trust the security personnel whereas 3.9% did not trust them at all. A respondent in Jenta Adamu Ward recounted that:

I do not think we have confidence on the security to protect us. How many number or how many are they in number? So, I think they should augment security personnel by supporting the vigilante that we have (May, 2016).

Another respondent and community Head in Sarkin Arab during IDI session submitted that:

The security personnel are inadequate despite that, we have confidence on them. If not because of their timely arrivals and reinforcements when the city was in fire, only the lucky would be alive by now. We saw hell here when the military were not here (May, 2016).

For the religious faithful that dominated the areas of the respondents, 67.1% stated that, there are predominantly occupied by Christians, 19.3% Muslims and 13.3% different religious faithful are living in their areas whereas adherents of traditional religion comprise only 0.3%. The table further displays that, military has been present in most of the areas in Jos metropolis with 74.8%, 15.0% said the Police has been in their areas, while 10.2% of the respondents stated that, both military and the Police have been in their areas to ensure peace and stability. Also, on the adequacy of security personnel in various locations, 46.7% said the security personnel are adequate and 43.3% indicated inadequacy of security personnel. A respondent and religious leader in Giring Ward during IDI stated that:

Well there are check points, not long ago the President asked these check points to be stopped because instead of doing what they are asked to do, they use it to exploit people and enrich themselves. So instead of helping, they cause problem. Now there are not check points per se in our areas (June, 2016)

Overwhelming majority of respondents 87.7% opined that their areas are occupied predominantly by single ethnic group whereas 12.3% were of the opinions that their areas are not dominated by a single ethnic group. A respondent in Anguwan Doki Ward submitted that:

Of course, we have all nationalities not just Nigerians, we have nationalities that are resident here, we have all languages and tribes. Yes, of course we have Christians and Muslims, predominantly Christians but we have Muslims too (June, 2016).

Another respondent in Gyel-Bukuru Ward recounted that:

Of course, there are people of different tribes in our areas. Religion hmmm may be, very, very few Muslims because of the crises situation had relocated (June, 2016).

Both quantitative and qualitative results showed a general satisfaction with and moderate confidence on the security personnel however what is apparent is the city has remained sharply divided along religious lines. Indeed, most of the areas surveyed are occupied predominantly by adherents of a particular faith. This implies the existence of mutual distrust between the residents and security personnel and residents among themselves. Public trust is important to internal security operations particularly in democratic societies to 'earn' legitimacy for their actions from citizens. From this point of view therefore, effective security operative mechanisms, good and confidential relationships with citizens are of primary importance to the maintenance of law, order and resolving conflicts. Thus, it is believed that the trust and satisfaction of the residents on the security operatives enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the security operational tools and strategies adopted. Therefore, living in separated residential areas indicates the existence of growing mistrust and grievances because despite the presence of armed security personnel. The results showed that residents are no longer living in residential areas mixed with people from different religions in most of the areas of Jos metropolis.

SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS

The researchers aggregated the respondents regardless of their socio-demographic characteristics in the collection and analysis of data. The study examined the politics of security deployment to Plateau State in general and Jos in particular since the outbreak of 2001 crisis. The study discovered that, significant majority of the respondents perceived that the security personnel were

deployed to protect the interest of a particular religion and ethnic nationalities in Jos. This agrees with the study carried out by Siddiqa (2013) who reported that the military and the dominant elite's mindset resulted in deployment and application of maximum force in handling political crisis in the Eastern wing of the state. The military's partnership with forces of the religious right such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and its militant wings came in handy to unleash terror upon the Bengalis. It also explained the negative perception that some segments of the residents have on the security operatives that handled security issues. However, substantial minority of the respondents disagreed with the assertion that security personnel were deployed to protect certain interest and party to the conflict. This argument was validated by Bhakti, et, al, (2009) who found out that given the historical dual roles of the military (politics and security), the military "has been able to set agenda and perpetrate violence without civilian oversight". For instance, this has led to different acts of violence in Papua, perpetrated by the police and military when they were deployed for peacekeeping mission of civil unrest.

Also, it has been found out that, religion has been the major consideration in the posting of the Heads of security personnel to Plateau State. For more than a decade, no Muslim Commissioner of Police was posted to Plateau State. Since the formation of Special Task Force (Operation Safe Heaven) in 2010, none of its past and present commandant is a Muslim, unlike the posting of GOC 3rd Armoured Division Jos, which was a balanced after the transfer of Major General Saleh Maina, whose reign was beleaguered with criticisms, accusations and allegations of laxity in 2011. The following are General Officer Commanding (GOC) that came after Saleh Maina. They include: Major General S. O. Idoko 2011-2012, Major General Nwaogbo 2012-2013, Major General E. B Awala 2013-2014, Major General J. S. Zaruwa 2014, Major General Fatai Alli 2014-2015, Major General H. Umaru 2015-2016 and Brigadier General M. S. A. Aliyu 2016-till date. This shows ethnic and regional considerations have not gained prominence like religion in the deployment of security personnel to Jos metropolis.

The result of the study showed that the city has been polarized and segmented along religious division after episode of each of the violent unrest. The communities that were hitherto living together now pose threat to each other and residential pattern and commercial activities were conducted with religious and ethnic caution.

Findings revealed that living in separated residential areas indicates the existence of growing mistrust and grievances because despite the presence of armed security personnel. It is evident that residents are no longer living

in residential areas mixed with people from different religions. This further exacerbates the sense of insecurity when people are living heterogeneously instead of homogenous to serve as a security to each other as well as resolve disputes amicably.

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The study found out that the deployment of Mobile Police (MOPOL) from 2001-2010 and the formation of Special Task Force (Operation Safe Heaven) in 2010 mainly comprised of military has generated mixed reactions and divergent perceptions among the residents of Jos metropolis. For instance, Majority of the Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Igbo, and other ethnic groups that are predominantly Christians were more contented with the deployment of the Mobile Police (MOPOL) whereas Fulani, Hausa and other ethnic groups that are dominantly Muslims questioned the neutrality, capability, performance and strength of the Nigerian Police Force in managing the crises, therefore supported the deployment of the military and expressed high degree of satisfaction with their performances.

The research further found that, security personnel deployed to Jos were inadequate to protect everywhere and their deployment has been politically motivated mostly by retired senior military from the State. It has also been discovered that, for about a decade a Muslim Commissioner of Police has not been posted to Plateau State, the Commandants of the Special Task Force were mostly Christians but the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 3rd Armour Division Jos has been fair and just to both religions and ethnic groups according to the findings.

Furthermore, it has found out that, there are strong allegations from both religions (Christians and Muslims) that the crises have been sponsored by some groups, countries and individuals from outside Plateau State and Nigeria. Related to this finding, results indicated the existence of conflict entrepreneurs that are benefiting from insecurity situation. These include mobs, thieves, contractors that supply food items and relief materials to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Government officials that benefit from the allocation and release of funds for such humanitarian exigency.

The furthermore, the study discovered that, Jos metropolis was polarized along religious divisions. In all the areas surveyed, they are exclusively occupied by followers of same religious belief. Expressed another way, Christians and Muslims lived in separated areas except in some few residential areas occupied by top and middle income earners such as Millionaires Quarters, Sated Low-cost and Federal Low-cost Housing Estates. This is substantiated by Aliyu, et

al. (2015, p. 16) that in Jos today, people do not just take accommodation in any part of the town of their fancies. They have to do extensive research to find out whether the area is safe or not. This is also applicable to areas that are occupied by Muslims. For a Christian, only an area that is inhabited by Christians is considered safe. No Muslim in his right senses would take up an apartment in such an area.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Security personnel notably military, Mobile Police (MOPOL) and Operation Rainbow should display high degree of neutrality in order to earn the confidence of the residents and change their perceptions in Jos. Religious, ethnicity and geopolitical should not be criteria for security posting of Heads and deployment of subordinates to Plateau State especially Jos metropolis.

Ethnic, regional and religious backgrounds should not be criteria and major considerations for security personnel deployment to violent area. Relatedly, Security agents should identify and arrest the culprits and sponsors that engineered the crises in order to benefit from it and prosecute them to serve as a deterrent to present and potential conflict entrepreneurs, organizations, countries and individuals.

Security agencies should deploy adequate security personnel to scene of violence, ensure prompt payments of their emoluments, equipped them with cutting-edge weapons and equipment in order to get optimum performance to the satisfactions and expectations of the citizens by forestalling violence, maintaining serene and securing environment as well as restoring peace whenever there is an outbreak of violence.

ALTERNATIVE

Periodic eruption of violence involving Christians and Muslims in Nigeria's highly diverse middle-belt" Plateau State capital, Jos, is a case in point. This violence is usually reported as communal conflict. This characterization, however, overlooks some of the institutional arrangements of Nigeria's federal system that fosters this violence, especially security men handling of the crises which further polarize the long standing dispute and conflicts (Aapengnuo, 2010, p. 3).

In what appears to be the non-military solution to the insecurity to the security challenges in Plateau State, the Plateau State Government introduced Partnership with civil society and international development partners. Under

this strategy, the state has sought to bridge the communication gap with civil society in the state through the establishment of the offices of a Special Adviser on Peace Building, and a Special Adviser on Civil Society Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations, whose roles are to co-ordinate with non-state actors. This has entailed regular meetings and dialogues, joint Eid and Christmas feasts, as well as frequent discussions with border communities. The Plateau Oneness Dialogue Forum, an initiative of former Governor Jonah Jang coordinated by the Directorate of Research and Planning in the Governor's office, which proved to be an important platform for the exchange of ideas between government and citizens. With support from the German International Co-operation (GIZ), the forum has convened dialogue sessions on issues related to the media and conflict management, the role of academia in conflict management, youth and security and setting benchmarks for safety (NSRP, 2014, p. 4).

This is an attempt to stop or reduce the militarization of internal security due to deployment of armed soldiers and Mobile Police Force. The above policy was designed to overturn and allow the non-military option to explore avenues for solving the lingering security challenges. This underscores the establishment of the Plateau State Inter-Religious Peace Council in 2010. Williams (2013, p. 3) opined that, an effective political strategy is a prerequisite for success. Peace operations are instruments, not strategies. To be successful, peace operations must be part of an effective political strategy and peace process not a substitute for them. Without a viable political strategy, peace operations should not be an automatic response to all wars. As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice put it, "peacekeepers cannot do everything and go everywhere" (Rice, 2009). First and foremost, it is unwise to deploy peace operations in active war zones unless they are part of a viable political process for managing or resolving the conflict. Nor should peacekeepers be deployed unless they have active cooperation from the host government(s) in question. However, the most striking inhibition to any alternative is the polarization or division of the residential pattern and major markets in the metropolis along religious cliché. This breeds mutual distrust and raises fear of reprisal attacks or future eruption of violence. This has been the lame excuse put forward by government for the continuous existence of Special Task Force in Jos metropolis and other parts of Plateau State.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analyses and discussions, conclusion is drawn from the research. Violent conflict stems from multiple interconnected causes. There are key factors or variables identified that determine whether communal, political and

religious disputes evolved into violence or settled peacefully. These variables could be causes of violence or causes of peace. Ethnicity, religious intolerance and perceived marginalization between the numerically, educationally and economically superior group of people and the weak have been the major causes of violence in heterogeneous societies of Sub-Saharan Africa for decades Jos, Nigeria inclusive. The violence in Jos led to the breakdown in trust between communities that were hitherto living harmoniously and their polarizations along the lines of ethnicity, politics and religion, which grow with each incidence of violence. This gulf is heightened by historical animosities of who owns the Jos city as well as certain administrative practices especially those relating to indigene-settler dichotomy and Christian-Muslim divide.

In all episodes of the crises, the immediate of response of government especially Federal Government during and after the outbreak of violence was the deployment of armed security personnel whose operations in most cases have generated mixed reactions of commendations and condemnations from the people where the operations are meant to protect. The perceived politicization of the security operatives' posting along ethnic, regional and religious considerations has eroded the confidence people have on the security personnel due to perceived injustice and bias on one hand and earned confidence and satisfaction from other groups that perceived the operations as favourable to them on the other. Earlier it was discovered that, security personnel deployed to Jos were inadequate to secure the entire Jos metropolis. Again, their deployment has been politically motivated and mostly by retired senior military from the State.

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